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Contradictions and Paradoxes: rereading Habermas’ charge of ‘performative contradiction’ in light of 
Derrida’s account of the paradoxes of philosophical grounding 
 
Several commentators have blamed poststructuralism for the advent of ‘post truth’ politics 
(Grayling, 2015; Calcutt, 2016; Coughlan, 2017). The suggestion is that poststructuralist claims about ‘anti-
foundationalism’ prepared the ground for the current situation; where leading statesmen now dismiss 
seemingly factual information as ‘fake news’, and, on a paucity of evidence, invoke their own ‘alternative 
facts’. These comments about the dangers of ‘French theory’ reiterate concerns levelled by critical 
theorists and others going back over several decades (Searle, 1983; Habermas, 1987a). Poststructuralists 
have long been criticised for their supposedly inconsistent approach to epistemology, with the suggestion 
that this leads to a related moral and political waywardness. In this paper, I take issue with these views, by 
revisiting the infamous charge of a ‘performative contradiction’ that Jürgen Habermas levelled against an 
assortment of what he called post-Nietzschean ‘totalising critiques of reason’ (Habermas, 1987a). 
Specifically, I reconsider points of similarity and difference between Habermas and Jacques Derrida on the 
status of philosophical foundations. I read their respective approaches against the background of a 
conceptual distinction – outlined in sections one and two - between contradictions and paradoxes; where 
contradictions - in their various forms (logical, dialectical, and performative) - point to some inconsistency 
that is potentially resolvable within the parameters of rational discourse, but paradoxes are constitutively 
irresolvable and represent a more fundamental limit point of reason. Habermas’ charge of performative 
contradiction is outlined in section three, and with the preceding conceptual apparatus in place, I make the 
case that his underlying objective is best understood as an effort to contain the inherent paradoxes of 
philosophical grounding, by reducing them to the status of a less troublesome; that is potentially 
resolvable, contradiction. 
Habermas has sought to problematize modes of social analysis that criticise the negative 
consequences of rationality (for example in the form of ideology critique, a critique of instrumental reason, 
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or a Foucauldian analysis of power relations), without at the same time appealing in some way to rational 
foundations as the source of their critique (i.e. in the form of epistemological/moral grounds). On 
Habermas’ account, those who imagine they can advance such a ‘totalising’ critique of reason exhibit a 
basic inconsistency, i.e. they find themselves in a ‘performative contradiction’. He adopts the idea of the 
performative contradiction from Karl-Otto Apel,1 and defines it as occurring ‘when a constative speech 
act…rests on non-contingent presuppositions whose propositional content contradicts the asserted 
proposition’ (Apel, 1987; 277; 1998: 87, 91; Habermas, 1990:80).The importance of this claim in Habermas’ 
work cannot be overstated.2 However, through a reconsideration in section four of the critique that 
Derrida raised against Michel Foucault’s early work on the history of madness; we see that Derrida 
explicitly shared Habermas’ view that it is not possible to critique reason from a position of externality. 
Indeed, one of the key themes that drove Derrida’s work, especially his early work, was precisely to reflect 
upon reason’s relationship to its own limits and foundations.3  In so doing, he developed an exemplary 
                                                 
1Apel developed a theory of speech pragmatics which is, like Habermas’ approach, grounded in the 
presuppositions of an ‘ideal communication community’. Apel similarly mobilised his theory against the 
‘postmodernists’ and others who are sceptical of fully grounded epistemological foundations, for example 
critical rationalists like Karl Popper. 
2 The charge of a performative contradiction is still standardly invoked as a reproach against those who 
problematize notions of reason and progress. See for example Martyn Hammersley, who says performative 
contradiction is at the core of postmodernism (Hammersley, 2005: 180). And, more recently, Payrow 
Shabani who has levelled the charge of an ‘embryonic performative contradiction’ against Amy Allen’s 
critique of Habermas’ account of modernity and progress (Allen, 2016a; Shabani, 2017; 65 and for Allen’s 
reply: Allen 2017). See also footnote 16 below.  
3 It is important to appreciate the proximity between Habermas and Derrida on this point, which is largely 
overlooked in the literature. Two notable exceptions are Koopman (2010) and Allen (2016b), each of 
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account of the paradoxical status of philosophical grounding, understood as both necessary and 
impossible. I claim that we ought to accept the force of this Derridean position, and reread Habermas 
charge of ‘performative contradiction’ in light of this perspective.4  
Rather than rejecting Habermas’ position outright, I show that his critique intimates towards 
necessary ambiguities characteristic of philosophical foundations. However, this does not mean that 
Habermas was correct in his characterisation of poststructuralism as inherently ‘contradictory’. Instead, in 
section five I show that Habermas’ approach exhibits certain ideological qualities, where it both points 
towards but also conceals the inherent paradoxes of philosophical grounding. This becomes especially 
evident when we compare Habermas and Karl Otto Apel’s responses to the famous ‘Munchhausen 
trilemma’ (explained below). Here, we find Apel willing to follow through on a strong claim to ‘ultimate 
foundations’, whereas Habermas’ takes a more attenuated and fallibilist view. In the end, Habermas’ 
position resembles Derrida’s account of the paradoxical conditions of rational discourse, whilst he 
nonetheless formally repudiates this. Moreover, Habermas’ strategy – of seeking to translate constitutive 
paradoxes into more manageable contradictions – features in other aspects of his work, which I illustrate 
briefly with reference to his thoughts on the ‘paradoxes’ of toleration as well as his well-known reflections 
                                                                                                                                                                                
whom has acknowledged this proximity, and stressed how this becomes evident in Habermas’ and 
Derrida’s respective critiques of Foucault.  
4 In his recent evaluation of the Foucault/Derrida debate Jonas points out that in his later work Derrida 
moved beyond this emphasis on reason’s internal relationship with itself. In his more explicitly ethical 
writings, Derrida drew attention instead to a moment of ‘absolutely alterity’ to which, as Jonas puts it, ‘no 
discourse or attempt at understanding could [possibly] be adequate’ (Jonas, 2015: 586). Moreover, this 
reference to the figure of a certain ‘otherness’, beyond reason, becomes associated in Derrida’s thinking 
with an unconditional call to Justice and responsibility. I consider this development below. Whilst this 
undoubtedly marks a certain point of departure in Derrida’s work, we see that his focal point nevertheless 
remained focused on the paradoxical status of ethico-political lie.  
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on the ‘co-originality’ of democracy and constitutionalism. Indeed, the purpose of rereading Habermas’ 
infamous claim through the vantage point of this conceptual framework is not only to throw new light on 
this crucial aspect of his theory. The point here is also to draw out the political implications of the 
differences between contradictions and paradoxes, and in the conclusion we see how the latter offer more 
fertile recourses for an adequate response to so called ‘post-truth’ politics.    
 
Contradictions: potentially resolvable inconsistencies in rational argumentation  
The concepts of contradiction and paradox represent distinct ways of articulating the limits of 
reason, which have been reflected upon throughout the tradition of western philosophy reaching back to 
antiquity. The aspiration to eliminate contradictions and paradoxes is also ancient in origin. For example, 
Aristotle sought to establish criteria of valid arguments and to ‘prove’ that contradictions in arguments 
could be logically eliminated. Opponents that affirmed ‘contradictories’ - such as Protagoras - could be 
refuted by demonstrating how their only seemingly meaningful statements are predicated on false 
premises (Aristotle, 1998: 89-110). The influence of Aristotelian logic has underpinned philosophy to the 
present day. Analytical philosophers in particular have sought to ground the truth of propositions on 
Aristotle’s laws of thought. These are encapsulated by Bertrand Russell as follows: 1) The law of identity: 
‘Whatever is, is’, 2) The law of non-contradiction: ‘Nothing can both be and not be’ in the same sense at 
the same time, 3) The law of the excluded middle: ‘Everything must either be or not be’ (Russell, 1946, 72). 
For many contemporary thinkers, these principles remain critically significant in determining criteria for 
establishing truth and eliminating contradictions from our understanding of the world (Wilde, 1989: 9).  
However, the notion of contradiction requires greater specificity and falls into a variety of 
categories (Sainsbury, 1995).5 To scrutinise Habermas’s concept of a ‘performative contradiction’, it will 
first be helpful to acknowledge three predominant understandings of contradiction in the tradition. The 
                                                 




first relates narrowly to statements or propositions and is commonly associated with formal logic and with 
analytical philosophy. A contradiction arises between two conflicting statements both claiming to be true 
at the same time and in the same sense. Contradictions of this sort breach Aristotle’s laws of thought. For 
example, the following statement ‘I am tall and I am not tall’ is inconsistent. To be coherent, one part of 
the statement must be shown to be true and the other to rest on false premises (Rescher, 2001).  
The second notion of contradiction is associated with Hegelian dialectics. Hegel criticised Aristotle’s 
first law of thought, i.e. the law of identity: ‘whatever is is,’ which he considered ‘nothing more than the 
expression of an empty tautology’ (Hegel, 1999: 413). According to Hegel, the identity of a given 
proposition does not have positive content but is inextricably bound up in a dialectical relationship to that 
which is ‘excluded as its other’ (Hegel, 1999: 415, 431). Furthermore, from Hegel’s perspective, 
contradiction is not limited to concepts, arguments, and statements, but is also an ontological 
characteristic of the relations between things, entities, or phenomena (Hegel, 1999: 34). Hegel says that 
every entity contains within itself its opposite determination, i.e. its contradiction, and cannot be posited 
without this (Hegel, 1999: 82, 83, 431). However, as is well known, Hegel also presented ‘contradiction’ as 
the driving force of the dialectical process, where the opposition within the entity repeatedly resolves itself 
by the ‘self-transposition of itself into its opposite’ (Hegel, 1999: 433). The contradiction (e.g. between 
Being and not-Being) is ‘mediated’ through what Hegel calls a ‘sublation’ (Aufhebung) or a higher unity 
(Hegel, 1999: 107). Once the Aufhebung overcomes a given opposition, a new contradiction is generated, 
which also preserves the previous contradiction (Hegel, 1999: 107, 433)  
In addition to logical and dialectical contradictions, a third conception of contradiction is associated 
with post-Wittgensteinian philosophies of language. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein drew 
our attention away from formal logic and towards instead the meaning of words, understood in terms of 
their use in every day speech or ‘language games’ (Wittgenstein, 1968: 23). Building on Wittgenstein’s 
approach, John Austin stresses that there are countless forms of speech that violate the law of logical non-
contradiction (Austin, 1975: 45). The philosopher of language therefore needs to move beyond a focus on 
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the logical consistency of a given speech act, to look instead at the total situation in which the utterance is 
raised (Austin, 1975: 52). With this approach, Austin shows how certain statements imply the truth of 
other statements or that certain assertions commit the speaker to other assertions; in other words, each 
performance is inevitably linked to another performance (Austin, 1975: 47). Austin gives the example of 
the following statement ‘John’s children are all bald’ (Austin, 1975: 50). This presupposes that John has 
children. What happens if this statement is made when John has no children? According to Austin, under 
these conditions this statement is not strictly false, and this is because it is devoid of reference, and 
reference is necessary for a statement to be true or false (Austin, 1975: 50-2). Instead, the statement is 
‘void’ or ‘infelicitous’ because the constative part of the statement (what is stated) conflicts with the 
presuppositions assumed in the statement; or, as he sees it, it has contravened one or more of the 
conditions of sincerity, correctness of form or suitability of content (Austin, 1975: 14-15, 51). In other 
words, a performative contradiction arises when the propositional content of a speech act contradicts the 
presuppositions invoked in making the speech act (Austin, 1975: 48-52). 
The Austinian conception is of course pivotal to Habermas’ charge of a ‘performative contradiction’ 
and I return to this in more detail below. First however, we should note a common characteristic of each of 
these accounts of contradiction, which is that they are all potentially resolvable or reconcilable within the 
terms of the approach that has postulated them. In Aristotle’s laws of thought the inconsistencies between 
the conflicting parts of a contradictory statement can be resolved by demonstrating one part of the 
statement to be true and the other false. The ‘resolution’ in Hegelian dialectics is not straightforward. The 
contradictions between concepts or entities are not immediately resolved because they are preserved in 
the Aufhebung. However, there is a moment of ultimate resolution in Hegel’s dialectic where all the 
preserved contradictions are reconciled in the notion of ‘Absolute Knowledge’ (Hegel, 1977: 808; Derrida, 
1982: ix). Likewise, the performative contradiction characteristic of the ‘infelicitous’ speech act is also 
resolvable. It is possible to show a person who is caught in a performative contradiction that in the act of 
uttering their statement s/he has made several assumptions that conflict with the constative content of 
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her/his utterance. Indeed, we can define a contradiction as a set of conflicting or inconsistent statements, 
phenomena, or circumstances that can in principle be resolved. In fact, the ‘ideal’ of resolution is implicit in 
the notion of contradiction, and it is for this reason that contradictions – logical, dialectical, or 
performative – do not present a challenge to reason as such. They are inconsistencies that are 
nevertheless manageable or potentially resolvable within the parameters of philosophical discourse.  
 
Paradoxes: inherently irresolvable tensions 
Unlike contradictions, there is a general lack of clarity about the definition of paradoxes.6 The term 
is often invoked without sufficient specificity, and this is by those who are critical of paradoxes as well as 
by those who celebrate them. Here, I draw out some of the key characteristics, as well as delimiting more 
specifically the idea of aporia, understood here as a specific modality of paradox.7 On one level, paradoxes 
are entertaining; they often have a riddle or joke like aspect to them (Northrop, 1964). Consider for 
example, the oldest recorded paradox articulated by the Greek philosopher Eubulides of Megara who said 
that ‘Epimenides the Cretian says that all Cretians are liars’ (Cargile, 1995: 678-80). The ambiguity and 
circularity in this statement is palpable. However, paradoxes also point more seriously to an apparent 
insufficiency in reason, and - unlike contradictions - the emphasis here is on an inherent irresolvability in 
                                                 
6 For different definitions see, for example: Quine, 1976; Mates, 1981; Sainsbury, 1995; Rescher, 2001; 
Sorenson, 2003.  
7 Elsewhere I have explored the different definitions of ‘paradox’ in more detail (Author). There I have 
recovered the etymology of para-doxa, as a statement that is ‘contrary to received opinion’, and made the 
case that these original connotations are largely overlooked when we equate paradoxes with aporia; a 
tendency which is long standing in the tradition. I have also explored the not insignificant political 
implications of the differences between aporia and para doxa. However, for the purposes of this paper we 
bracket these concerns and allow the widely-held view that paradoxes and aporia are broadly equivalent, 
to stand. Here I use the two terms interchangeably.  
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rational argumentation. Consequently, most western philosophers have mistrusted paradoxes, ever since - 
as one commentator puts it - ‘early Greek philosophers’ first invoked them to ‘confuse their opponents in 
debate’ (Northrop, 1964: 13). Indeed, paradoxes have the power to ‘bring about [a] crisis in thought’ and 
to shatter the internal consistency of reason (Quine, 1976: 5, 11).8 Apart from the early pre-Socratic 
philosophers - as well as Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and the poststructuralists - paradoxes have 
therefore been subject to strategies of containment by philosophers and normative political theorists. One 
of the key strategies has been to represent paradoxes as if they were contradictions, i.e. to devalue their 
inherently irresolvable quality by treating them as (more manageable) contradictions waiting to be 
resolved (see for example Kant, 1993: Oakeshott, 1983: 139, fn5). Crucially, we will see that this strategy is 
ultimately what is at stake in Habermas’ charge of ‘performative contradiction’.  
However, we first need to scrutinise more specifically the manner in which the sense of paradoxical 
perplexity manifests itself, and this requires looking more closely at the idea of aporia. As we will see more 
fully below, the notion of aporia best fits Derrida’s account of the ambiguous status of philosophical 
foundations. He says an aporia is neither an ‘apparent or illusionary’ inconsistency, nor is it a dialectical 
contradiction in the Hegelian sense (Derrida, 1993: 16). Aporia is the Greek term for ‘puzzle’ and points 
instead to a constitutive impasse and an associated sense of perplexity. It is a compound of two Greek 
terms: a (without) and porous (passage); an aporia leaves us at a loss about where to begin, what to say, or 
how to proceed. In other words, aporia are blocked passageways within arguments, or within philosophical 
reasoning and logic; they ‘raise questions and objections, without necessary providing answers’ (Flew, 
1984: 16). For example, in Book IV of the Physics, Aristotle presents the apparent obscurities of the 
passage of time as an aporia, i.e. where ‘time [simultaneously] is and time is [also] what is not’ (Aristotle, 
2015: Book IV). When we contemplate time we come up against the limits of reason and find ourselves 
                                                 
8 For example, Bertrand Russell’s 1901 antinomy: ‘there is no class whose members are precisely classes 




astonished and perplexed. As Aristotle puts it, ‘I am stuck, I cannot get out, I am helpless’ (Aristotle quoted 
in Derrida, 1993: 6). This characterisation draws attention to the force of paradox, or more precisely 
aporia, vis-à-vis contradiction. Unlike contradictions, paradoxes contain opposing propositions that cannot 
be reconciled because the tension is constitutive of the statement or the event or phenomena it describes. 
The premises and conclusions of a paradox may well be self-contradictory, but they are also both true at 
the same time and in the same sense.  
My claim is that the conceptual distinction between contradictions and paradoxes is crucially 
important for understanding points of similarity and difference between Habermas and Derrida with 
respect to the status of philosophical foundations, and, as we will see Habermas’ charge of ‘performative 
contradiction’ reveals certain ideological qualities when it is reread in light of these distinctions. We should 
also note at this point that the irresolvable nature of paradoxes and aporia does not mean that they 
necessarily lead to a deadlock or a dead end. Indeed, Derrida has stressed the productive quality of aporia, 
especially in the realm of ethical and political life, and we also return to this point at the end of the paper.  
 
Revisiting Habermas’ charge of a ‘performative contradiction’  
Habermas initially levelled the charge of performative contradiction against Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer. He singles out Adorno for failing ‘to provide a systematic grounding of the concept of 
reason to which he implicitly appeals’ (Habermas, 1979: 72). Habermas further substantiates and extends 
the charge to a range of the ‘moral sceptics’, by which he has in mind poststructuralists and other post-
Nietzscheans (Habermas, 1987a; Habermas, 1990: 76). For Habermas, Nietzsche fully explodes 
‘modernity’s husk of reason’ by providing an ‘unmasking critique of reason that sets itself outside the 
horizon of reason’ (Habermas, 1987a: 59, 96). He says Nietzsche carries ‘to its end the self-abolition of 
epistemology inaugurated by Hegel and continued by Marx’, arriving at a denial of the foundations of 
critical reflection altogether (Habermas, 1972: 290-291). There is no denying the overall influence of 
Nietzsche’s thought on poststructuralism. However, my claim is that the indictment in Habermas’ reading 
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of Nietzsche is specifically misplaced against Derrida.9 Through a juxtaposition of Habermas and Derrida on 
the question of the foundations of reason, we first see clear proximity between them; that is in their 
shared view of our incapacity to critique reason from a point of externality. However, this proximity quickly 
turns into profound differences when we consider their respective positions with respect to the conceptual 
distinction between contradictions and paradoxes. 
Habermas’ account of the performative contradiction incorporates elements of Aristotelian and 
Hegelian logic, and overall he upholds the ‘elementary principles of formal logic’ (Strong & Sposito, 1985: 
280). However, Habermas also explicitly rejects the ‘cunning of reason’ that propels Hegel’s account of the 
dialectic, and he acknowledges that the justification of philosophical foundations cannot be grounded 
‘solely on the concept of logical inference’ (Habermas, 1990: 79). The question of what is presupposed 
when the philosopher seeks to justify his/her arguments to others in rational debate is fundamental, 
rather than the internal consistency of his/her process of deduction or his/her mode of syllogistic 
reasoning. Habermas says, the ‘deductive concept of justification is too narrow for the exposition of 
pragmatic relations between argumentative speech acts’ (Habermas, 1990: 79). However, this does not 
mean that Habermas abandons the ideal of rational resolution, which, we have seen, is inherent in each of 
the three modalities of ‘contradiction’. Instead, this goal is carried over from the Aristotelian and Hegelian 
lineage to his theory of speech pragmatics.  
                                                 
9 As Martin Jay (1993:25) has pointed out, despite the importance of this claim as one of the ‘reigning 
regulative ideals of his universal pragmatics’, there is ‘no sustained examination’ of the performative 
contradiction in the body of Habermas’s work. Jay has explored multiple examples of ‘performative 
contradiction’ in the work of Foucault, Rodolphe Gasche, and Paul de Man. Martin Morris (1996) argues 
that Habermas’s charge of performative contradiction is not valid against Adorno. For additional critical 
commentary on Habermas’ notion of performative contradiction, see for example: Hammersley, 2005; 
Allen, 2009, 2014; Rancière, 2004; Russell and Montin, 2015; Searle, 2007. 
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Like Austin, Habermas emphasises that speaking subjects make necessary presuppositions in the 
enunciation of speech acts. He is concerned with the conditions that determine the pragmatics of speech 
and the inconsistencies that arise when they are violated. Habermas demonstrates a performative 
contradiction in a hypothetical debate with a sceptic who asserts the following statement: ‘I hereby doubt 
that I exist’. On Habermas’ account, the speaker raises a truth claim - ‘I do not exist (here and now)’ – 
whilst, at the same time, the wider speech act presupposes the very thing that it denies, i.e. an ‘I’ that does 
exist (here and now) and who is responsible for asserting the statement (Habermas, 1990, 80). The speech 
act is inconsistent because the personal pronoun in each side of the contradictory assertion ‘refers to one 
and the same person’. In other words, the subject of enunciation is caught in an inconsistency; the content 
of her statement simultaneously contradicts certain presuppositions that are also contained in the wider 
speech act. 
However, Habermas’s project of ‘universal pragmatics’ is more ambitious than Austin because he 
seeks to make explicit the implicit procedural rules of transparency, sincerity and inclusion governing the 
interactions of competent speakers and he attributes them with a foundational – that is necessary and 
universal - status. Indeed, the charge of a performative contradiction is linked to Habermas’ more general 
theory of communicative action, with its emphasis on the validity claims - of truth and normative rightness 
or appropriateness – which he thinks are implicit in the very fact of communication (Jay, 1993, 28). 
Habermas calls the universal rules governing communication the ‘presuppositions of argumentation’ 
(Habermas, 1990L: 86). These are inferred rules of openness inherent in communication and the core 
features are well known. In any example of free and reciprocal communication: i) ‘nobody who could make 
a relevant contribution may be excluded; ii) … all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make 
contributions; iii) … the participants must mean what they say, and iv) …[the] communication must be 
freed from external and internal coercion so that the…stances that participants adopt on criticisable 
validity claims are motivated solely by the rational force of the better reasons’ (Habermas, 1990: 44). 
Following Apel (and we will come back to this in more detail below), Habermas argues that when 
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communicative subjects engage in argumentation they necessarily assume these norms of reasoned 
speech, at least as a counterfactual ideal. At one time, he described them as the characteristics of an ‘ideal 
speech situation’ (Habermas, 1990: 88). This was presented as a ‘reconstruction of the general symmetry 
of conditions that every competent speaker who believes he is engaging in an argumentation must 
presuppose as adequately fulfilled’ (Habermas, 1990: 88). They are ‘not mere conventions; rather, they are 
inescapable presuppositions’ of any instance of reasoned communication (Habermas, 1990: 89).  
Habermas is also renowned for being a prominent defender of the Enlightenment project and 
modernity. At the core of his defence is his presentation of modernity as a ‘learning project’ where the 
validity claims implicit in the fact of communication are progressively realised in the emergence and 
consolidation of reflective forms of rationality and in ‘post-conventional morality’ (Habermas, 1987a: 125; 
Habermas, 1987b: 98). In other words, the self-conscious subjects characteristic of modernity increasingly 
carry forward the Enlightenment ideals of moral universalism in their daily communicative practices, and 
these are also progressively embedded in institutional structures that are capable of distinguishing validity, 
authority and legitimacy from a more basic exercise of power. Given these assumptions, which are central 
to Habermas project, it is not surprising that he is critical of all those post-Nietzschean ‘totalising’ critiques 
of reason, who, as he sees it, refuse to give an account of their own presuppositions, and who implicitly 
‘raise validity claims only to [explicitly] renounce them’ (Habermas, 1987a: 336). 
This is core of what Habermas has in mind when he accuses a range of ‘moral sceptics’ and 
‘relativists’ of falling into performative contradiction. The point is to guard against those who make critical 
judgements about modernity and about particular configurations of power relations, but who deny their 
claims are underpinned by validity claims that can in principle be adjudicated by norms that have 
foundational status. Habermas has been uncompromising in his insistence that poststructuralists and 
others must accept as ‘valid a minimal number of unavoidable rules of criticism’ (Habermas, 1990: 81). 
Ultimately, this is because the presuppositions of argumentation are – on his account - implicit and 
embedded in the communicative practices of everyday life (Habermas, 1990: 100). The ‘sceptic may 
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[therefore explicitly] reject [the foundational status of] morality, but he cannot reject the ethical substance 
(Sittlichkeit) of the life circumstances in which he spends his waking hours, not unless he is willing to take 
refuge in suicide or serious mental illness’ (Habermas, 1990: 100). 
At this point we should note that it is not only the detail of Habermas’ own version of 
communicative foundationalism that is at stake in his charge of performative contradiction, but rather the 
status and the role of philosophical foundations as such. After all, Habermas does not level this critique 
against those who look to alternative sources for their moral and epistemological foundations, for example 
the young Marx or other left and right Hegelians.10 These thinkers may not have made the shift from the 
philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language. On Habermas’ view they therefore work with 
an inadequate set of philosophical foundations. However, his complaint is specifically directed to those 
who he thinks implicitly appeal to foundations but explicitly deny them. Indeed, this is precisely Habermas’ 
objection to Derrida, who he thinks ‘evade[s] the obligation to provide [philosophical] grounds’ by 
substituting the logical with the rhetorical (Habermas, 1987: 336).11 In the following section, we look more 
closely at Derrida’s work, and we see that Habermas’ account of Derrida’s position could not be more 
inaccurate. This becomes clear when we juxtapose Habermas’ account of the performative contradiction 
with Derrida’s critique of Foucault’s early work on the history of madness. In this discussion, we see that 
Derrida sounds uncannily like Habermas. Indeed, he shares Habermas’ view that ‘the revolution against 
reason, from the moment it is articulated, can operate only within reason’ (Derrida, 1978: 42; Derrida, 
                                                 
10 On Habermas’ reading, neither the radical nor the conservative Hegelians fall into performative 
contradiction because they ultimately want to hold on to the achievements of Hegelian dialectical reason. 
The radicals appropriate speculative reason as a liberating force and attempt to use it to bring forth social 
and political revolution. By way of contrast, the conservatives try to retain Hegelian reason as a 
‘remorative compensation for the pain of the inevitable diremptions of reason’ by arguing that the end of 
history has already arrived and thus absolute knowledge is achieved (See Habermas, 1987a, 59, 84). 
11 See Derrida 1983 where he explores several aporias to demonstrate their impossibility and impassibility.  
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1983). We need then to turn to these Derridean interventions, first to get a sense of the proximity 
between Habermas and Derrida on the necessity of philosophical grounding, but subsequently also to 
appreciate the full measure of what turns out to be Habermas’ effort to contain a constitutive paradox by 
demoting it to the status of a - potentially resolvable - contradiction.  
 
Derrida vs. Foucault, or the Derridean account of the paradoxical status of philosophical foundations 
In the 1970s Derrida and Foucault debated their respective readings of Descartes’ Meditations, and 
this served as a pretext for a more general discussion about the status of reason in western philosophy 
(Derrida, 1972; Foucault, 1989).12 In his early work, Madness and Civilisation, Foucault argued that 
madness has been excluded as an object of modern science and philosophy from Descartes onwards 
(Foucault, 1989: 393). Modern reason has constituted itself as the dominant form of knowledge through 
the exclusion of its other, i.e. non-reason in its various guises including madness. On Foucault’s account, 
‘the language of psychiatry…is [therefore] a monologue of reason about madness’ established on the basis 
of ‘a silence’ (Foucault, 1989: xii). To trace the ‘history of madness itself’, Foucault therefore aspired to 
step outside the bounds of reason and to speak directly for the mad, for those disparate voices silenced by 
the tradition of modern psychiatry (Foucault, 1989: xii.) His objective was not ‘to write the history of [the] 
language [of psychiatry], but rather the archaeology of [the] silence’ upon which it is founded (Foucault, 
1989: xii).  
However, in his essay ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’ Derrida took issue with Foucault’s 
reading of Descartes and claimed that Descartes did not exclude madness but ‘dismisses it as only one case 
of thought (within thought)’ (Derrida, 1978: 68). In other words, on Derrida’s account, madness is an 
example of that which reason seeks to contain within its interior, so that madness is regulated within the 
text of philosophy or psychiatry, or within the space of reason (Derrida, 1978: 68). He rejects the possibility 
                                                 
12 For recent discussions of the differences between Derrida and Foucault, see: Koopman, 2012; Rekert, 
2017; and the essays collected in Aryal, 2016 and in Cluster, 2016.  
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of writing a history of ‘madness itself, in its most vibrant state, before being captured by knowledge’ 
(Foucault cited in Derrida, 1978:  39-42). This is because the ‘misfortune of the mad, the interminable 
misfortune of their silence, is that their best spokesmen are those who betray them best, and once their 
silence is itself conveyed one has already passed over into the side of order into the terrain of reason’ 
(Derrida, 1978: 42). In short, Foucault’s archaeology of madness can only be articulated through the 
medium of the language, i.e. the order of reason and logos. From Derrida’s perspective, ‘there is no Trojan 
horse unconquerable by reason in general’ and so Foucault’s claim ‘to say madness itself’ is ‘self-
contradictory’ (Derrida, 1978: 42, 5). Indeed, Derrida summarises the situation of the would-be 
spokesperson for the mad in terms of a paradox: either she does ‘not mention…a certain silence, which can 
be determined only within a language and an order that will preserve the silence, or follow the madman 
down the road of his exile’ (Derrida, 1978: 42).13 
                                                 
13 Derrida’s critique of Foucault can of course be challenged, and the differences between them has given 
rise to wide-ranging debate and contrasting interpretations. Colin Koopman (2010: 55) defends Foucault, 
claiming that both Habermas and Derrida share an overly constricted ‘Weberian’ conception of modernity 
which shapes their reading of Foucault, but in terms he would not accept. On his account, Foucault rejects 
both Habermas’s attempt to liberate freedom from power as well as Derrida’s endeavour to locate 
madness within reason. John Rajchman (1991) similarly defends Foucault arguing that Habermas misreads 
Foucault’s work. Allen (2016b: 106) argues that Habermas and Derrida share a commitment to the 
‘transcendence of reason’ whilst Foucault’s critique is more historical and immanent. And Roy Boyne 
(1990: 79) contends that Foucault effectively concedes the force of Derrida’s general criticisms regarding 
historicity and reason and this is demonstrated in his methodological move from archaeology to 
genealogy. I am inclined to read Foucault’s efforts to liberate madness from reason in a more naturalist 
vein. Like Habermas, Derrida placed a premium on the role of language as the medium through which we 
access the world and events, and we might think of Foucault’s contribution as an effort to articulate the 
corporeal and yet intangible elements of ‘life’ that always press reason and language from a point of 
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It seems fruitful to compare Derrida’s accusation of ‘self-contradiction’ levelled against Foucault 
with Habermas’s charge of performative contradiction levelled against the poststructuralists in general. 
Indeed, Derrida and Habermas draw very similar conclusions about what happens when one tries to 
escape the ‘order of reason’ as such (Derrida, 1978: 48; Habermas, 1990: 100). As Derrida puts it, the only 
options available are to stay ‘silent’ or to follow the ‘madman down the road of exile’ (Derrida, 1978: 42). 
As Habermas says, the options are ‘taking refuge in suicide or serious mental illness’ (Habermas, 1990: 
100). The proximity is striking, and Derrida seems to accuse Foucault of what Habermas calls a 
‘performative contradiction’.14 Indeed, Derrida clearly shared Habermas view that is impossible to mount a 
critique of ‘rational discourse’, in this case the discourses of psychiatry, from a position outside of reason. 
In addition, Derrida and Habermas share the view that the recourse to ‘reason’ and logos is coextensive 
                                                                                                                                                                                
externality. From a more naturalist perspective, Foucault’s position has clear credibility, in its effort to 
make manifest the multiple senses that inhere in events and phenomena but which are never fully 
captured by the categories of linguistic expression. I explore the differences between Derrida’s position 
and a more naturalist figuration of the limits of reason in Author.  
14 For Derrida’s own comments on the idea of the performative contradiction see Derrida 1996, 2-6, 67, 93 
fn.10.  He does not mention Habermas or other proponents of the notion of performative contradiction 
such as John Searle by name but says that certain ‘German’ or ‘Anglo-American’ theorists think they have 
discovered an ‘unanswerable strategy’ and thereby made the charge of performative contradiction a 
‘puerile weapon’ (1996: 4). Derrida starts his rejection of the notion of performative contradiction with the 
paradoxical proposition ‘Yes, I only have one language, yet it is not mine’ (1996: 2). He highlights the 
contradictions inherent in language by drawing on his personal experience as a Franco-Maghrebian Jew so 
that he is always in the process of speaking the ‘monolingualism of the other’. See also Derrida, 2000, 6 
and Derrida 2005 where he mentions the affinities between his and Adorno’s work (aporias and negative 
dialectics) (2005: 176). Derrida says that Adorno literally speaks of the ‘possibility of the impossibility, of 
the paradox of the impossible possibility’ (2005:168). 
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with language use. However, it is also well known that Derrida does not share Habermas aspiration to 
present the rules of linguistic exchange in foundational terms, i.e. Habermas’ ‘presuppositions of 
argumentation’. We need then to look more closely at Derrida’s approach to philosophical grounding, and 
here the clear distinction between Habermas and Derrida, as representatives respectively of contradictions 
and paradoxes, begins to open up. 
As Rodolphe Gasché has stressed, Derrida’s early work should be understood as a sustained set of 
reflections on the status of philosophical foundations (Gasche, 1986). Rather than rejecting the need for 
philosophical grounding, as Habermas would have it, Derrida sought to find many varied ways to express 
the inherently paradoxical status of philosophical grounds. For example, the Derridean notions of 
différance, iterability, trace, and supplementarity have the paradoxical status of ‘quasi-transcendental 
infrastructures’ that do the work of both ‘grounding and ungrounding at the same time’ (Gasche 1986: 
161). This is not the place for an extended account of Derrida’s approach, but, in short, in Of 
Grammatology and the essays collected in Writing and Difference, Derrida sought to combine insights from 
the phenomenological tradition with Saussurean linguistics, and this in an effort to draw out the inherent 
relationality characteristic of linguistic structure and practice (Derrida, 1997). On Derrida’s account, this 
spatial and temporal relationality, or constitutive différance, provides conditions of possibility for the 
formation of any identity, but at the same time this elementary or foundational relationality is disruptive 
of every identity, hence the idea that the originary or grounding relationality provides simultaneously the 
conditions of possibility and impossibility (or im/possibility) of presence and identity (Gasche, 1986). 
Derrida’s repeated efforts to express the elusive object of philosophical grounding have an 
essentially aporetic structure, i.e. they point to the ‘non-passage’ or the ‘uncrossable path’ that is 
constitutive of the limits of language as well as attempts to ground reason and knowledge (Derrida, 1993: 
16; Beardsworth, 1996: 32). They resemble the labours of Sisyphus, or the obscure internal movements 
illustrated in Maurits Escher’s drawings. However, it should also be evident that Derrida does not practice 
what Habermas calls a ‘totalising critique of reason’ (Habermas, 1987a: xvii, 120,121). In fact, Derrida is 
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especially attuned to the need for philosophical foundations, which he recognises as both necessary and 
impossible. Indeed, Derrida provides an exemplary account of the aporetic structure of philosophical 
foundationalism, and, as we see below, he also points to the productive quality of aporia, i.e. as a 
condition of responsible ethical and political action. We should, I think, acknowledge the force of this 
Derridean viewpoint and re-examine Habermas’ charge of performative contradiction in light of this 
perspective.15 
 
Rereading Habermas’s charge of ‘performative contradiction’ in light of Derrida’s account of the 
paradoxes of philosophical grounding 
If we accept Derrida’s account of the aporetic status of reason’s relationship with its own ground, it 
becomes clear that Habermas’ charge of ‘performative contradiction’ does not stand up to scrutiny. Rather 
than calling bluff on the poststructuralists for their characteristic inconsistences, Habermas’ position serves 
a certain ideological function, where it both intimates towards but also conceals the inherently paradoxical 
status of philosophical grounding. In fact, if anything, it is Habermas who falls into inconsistency when he 
ignores or tempers the aporetic quality of every attempt at philosophical grounding, and speaks as though 
his account of the foundations of communicative action can be positively grounded. These ideological 
qualities inherent in Habermas approach become particularly evident when we compare Habermas and 
Apel’s respective thoughts on the performative contradiction, which Apel initially formulated in response 
to the so called ‘Munchhausen trilemma’. This is the idea that all attempts at ultimate foundation, or the 
                                                 
15 Allen has similarly stressed the productive element of aporia in contrast to Habermas’ position. Although 
he recognised the aporetic quality of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Allen takes odds with Habermas’ 
assessment of the impact of this book. Rather than Horkheimer and Adorno’s intervention leading to an 
unproductive deadlock, Dialectic of Enlightenment strives instead to articulate a basic ‘truth that can only 
be expressed through a fundamentally aporetically structured argument’, i.e. that Enlightenment 
rationality represents both freedom and unfreedom at the same time (Allen, 2014).  
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justification of first principles, are im/possible because they fall prey to one of three unacceptable 
situations of dogmatism, logical circularity, or infinite regress (Albert, 1985: Habermas, 1990: 79). These 
aporetic circumstances - with their various blocked passageways – closely resemble Derrida’s account of 
the impossible conditions of philosophy’s relationship with its own ground, and so it is vital, from 
Habermas’ perceptive, to find an adequate solution to the ‘trilemma’. Indeed, Habermas claims that Apel 
‘refuted’ the Munchhausen trilemma with his account of the ‘performative contradiction’ (Habermas, 
1990: 79). But is this really the case? And how do Apel and Habermas differ in their respective responses to 
this challenge?   
Habermas takes much of the detail of his account of the performative contradiction from Apel. He 
endorses Apel’s claim that those who deny the possibility of establishing rational foundations must have 
already presupposed the ‘discourse principle as the condition of possibility’ for the justification of their 
arguments. They have inadvertently conceded the foundational status of the ‘presuppositions of 
argumentation’ (with their procedural stipulations of transparency, inclusion, and reciprocity), because 
their acknowledgment of these suppositions (and the correlated notion of the legitimate ‘force [only] of 
the better argument’) is implicit in their very willingness to participate in a reasoned discussion about the 
status of foundations (Apel, 19080: 274-5; 1998: 87). With these contentions, Apel claimed to have 
outmanoeuvred the Munchhausen trilemma, and from here he proceeded to make the strong assertion 
that the presuppositions of argumentation must therefore have the status of ‘ultimate foundations’. They 
must be assumed by all participants, that is, if they want to participate in debate without falling into 
‘performative contradiction’ (Apel, 1987: 277; See also Papastephanou, 1998: 5-6). 
 Although broadly sympathetic to Apel’s response to the Munchhausen challenge, Habermas is 
nonetheless uneasy with Apel’s self-assured proclamation of the fully grounded status of the ‘ultimate 
foundations’ of communicative interaction. He says an ‘ultimate justification’ for the presuppositions of 
argumentation is ‘neither possible nor desirable’ (Habermas, 1990: 84). And although it is never explicitly 
stated, Habermas intimates that any attempt at ‘ultimate justification’ runs the risk of dogmatism. He says, 
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it is only when the ‘philosopher finds himself constrained does he offer ‘ultimate justifications’’, and he 
further claims that he can modify Apel’s position in order to ‘give up any claim to an ‘ultimate justification’ 
[but] without damage to the argument’ that the ideal conditions of rational discourse have a ‘necessary 
and universal’ status (Habermas, 1990: 77, 79). Indeed, Habermas presents the presuppositions of rational 
debate as ‘unavoidable’ and ‘inescapable’ but at the same time he says that they are not ‘ultimate 
foundations’ (Habermas, 1990: 77, 81, 89).  
As commentators have noted: with these slippery formulations Habermas effectively shifts ‘the 
deep structures of communication’ from Apel’s ‘ultimate foundations’ to a more ‘fallible and hypothetical 
ground’ (Chambers, 1996). As Simone Chambers puts it, Habermas ‘hopes to avoid the dangers of 
foundationalism while maintaining a foundation for his theory’ (Chambers, 1996: 113).16 However, from 
the vantage point of the Derridean perspective, it seems that Habermas can only make these amendments 
at the cost of invoking a certain paradox. The ‘rules of argumentation’ are ‘necessary and unavoidable’, ‘in 
a certain sense [they are] not fallible’, says Habermas, and yet their justification can only proceed 
negatively and they are explicitly denied the status of ‘ultimate foundations’ (Habermas, 1990: 81, 97). 
These claims are, in the end, not too dissimilar to Derrida’s account of the conditions of im/possibility of 
rational discourse, and yet Habermas formally denies that this is so. Again, we are left with the impression 
that he both alludes to, but also conceals, the paradoxical status of philosophical grounding.  
Moreover, at this point, we can see just how significant the charge of the performative 
contradiction is to Habermas’ overall enterprise. By relying on the notion of ‘performative contradiction’ 
he essentially provides only a negative justification for the most fundamental part of his theory. 
‘Demonstrating the existence of performative contradictions helps to identify the rules necessary for any 
argumentation game to work; if one is to argue at all [for instance about the status of philosophical 
foundations], there are no substitutes. The fact that there are no alternatives to these rules of 
argumentation is what is being proved; the rules themselves are not being justified’ (Habermas, 1990: 95). 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of these aspects of Habermas’ theory, see also Chapter 6 of Smith (1997).  
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In other words, Habermas ultimately pulls back from a fully explicit justification of the foundational status 
of his own assumptions. In the final analysis, ‘neither Habermas nor his followers’ have been able to 
provide a ‘formally valid derivation’ for the foundational status of the presuppositions of rational argument 
and communication (Finlayson, 2000: 43). And yet, Habermas has nonetheless mobilised his critique 
against a whole range of theorists – poststructuralists and first generation critical theorists – for failing ‘to 
provide a systematic grounding of the concept of reason to which [they] implicitly appeal’ (Habermas, 
1979: 72). 
As I see it, the effect of Habermas’ intervention is to translate what is really a constitutive paradox 
into the more manageable context of a ‘performative contradiction’. In other words, on this reading: 
Habermas position supresses - hides or diminishes - the irresolvable ambiguities and aporia inherent in 
reason’s attempt to account for its own foundations, i.e. by presenting this dilemma [or trilemma] instead 
in the form of a potentially resolvable contradiction. Indeed, the objective behind this strategy seems to be 
to sure up the fully foundational status of philosophical grounds, or, put differently, to safeguard reason’s 
self-consistency with-itself, which from the Derridean perspective has been shown to be im/possible. In 
fact, we have seen that this appears (almost) equally important – perhaps ‘co-original’ - in Habermas’ 
oeuvre, as the detail of his own account of the ‘presuppositions of argumentation’. 
As additional evidence for these underlying aspirations, we should note that this is not the only 
place in Habermas’ work where he is concerned to translate paradoxes into the more manageable status 
of potentially resolvable contradictions. For example, this is evident also in his lecture on toleration where 
Habermas first appears to acknowledge that there is something resembling a paradox at the core of 
toleration, only to pull back from this claim. Habermas accepts that in a democracy the state must strike a 
balance between ‘political freedoms’ and taking protective measures to ‘defend itself’, in other words 
there must be limits to toleration; there can be ‘no inclusion without exclusion’ (Habermas 2004: 7). 
However, he adds that this (only) ‘purported paradox’ effectively dissolves when these tensions are 
conceptualised in a dialectical manner (Habermas, 2004: 7-8). For Habermas, the paradox of toleration can 
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be worked through in the actual practices of liberal democratic societies, where the line between the 
tolerable and the intolerable can be repeatedly drawn in a non-arbitrary manner (Habermas, 2003: 2, 5).17 
In other words, Habermas cannot find a rational solution to the paradox of inclusion/exclusion, but he 
nonetheless intimates to the possibility of a de facto solution in the pragmatics of liberal democratic 
practice (Habermas, 2003: 5).  
This same attitude is evident also in his influential essay on ‘Constitutional Democracy: A 
Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?’ (Habermas, 2001; See also Habermas., 1996). As the 
question mark at the end of this title suggests, Habermas essentially sees a dialectical rather than a 
paradoxical relationship between democracy and constitutionalism or between popular sovereignty and 
the rule of law. Again, on his reading the tension between these competing principles is potentially 
resolvable. There is no reference to a ‘cunning of reason’ working itself out behind the backs of political 
actors in Habermas’ account, but he nonetheless thinks that modern citizens come increasingly to 
appreciate that ‘the laws of the republic…set limits on the people’s sovereign self-determination’ and ‘the 
rule of law requires that democratic will-formation not violate human rights that have been positively 
enacted as basic right’ (Habermas, 2001a, 766). In other words, democratic citizens become cumulatively 
proficient in the exercise of democratic authority in ‘the course of applying, interpreting, and 
supplementing constitutional norms’ (Habermas, 2001a, 771, 774-775). With this account of the 
progressive movement of modern constitutionalism, understood as a ‘project’ that must be carried 
forward across the generations, Habermas is able to present the ‘allegedly paradoxical relationship 
between democracy and the rule of law [as something that] resolves itself in the dimension of historical 
time’ (Habermas, 2001a, 768). This is then further evidence of the importance of this underlying strategy, 
i.e. of translating paradoxes into contradictions, in Habermas’ approach.  
By way of contrast, Chantal Mouffe (2000) and Bonnie Honig (2001) each draw on Derrida to 
present the conflicting principles of liberalism and democracy as a constitutive paradox which needs to be 
                                                 
17 For other texts by Habermas on tolerance see Habermas 1998. 
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perpetually (re)negotiated rather than progressively resolved. In Honig’s account in particular, Habermas’ 
dialectical reading forecloses contingent future possibility, i.e. by predetermining the general direction of 
democratic demands.18 This Derridean inspired alternative suggests, once again, the open possibilities 
inherent in the idea of constitutive aporia; because a paradoxical approach places greater premium on the 
open potentialities that emerges from democratic debate. It is to this idea of the politically productive 
quality of paradoxes that we turn by way of conclusion.    
 
Conclusion: paradoxical foundations and ‘post-truth’ politics 
 I have analysed points of similarity and differences between Habermas and Derrida on the key 
conceptual distinction between contradictions and paradoxes. We have seen that the ideal of resolution is 
inherent in the notion of contradiction, and this is evident in each of the three main forms outlined above: 
logical, dialectical and performative. As such, philosophers understand contradictions to be more 
manageable than - inherently irresolvable - paradoxes. At the heart of Habermas’ critique is his concern 
with the apparent inconsistencies of thinkers who challenge the negative consequences of modern 
rationality without appealing to rational foundations as the basis of their critique. As he sees it, these 
‘totalising’ critiques find themselves in a ‘performative contradiction’. However, this does not stack up in 
respect of Derrida’s position. By way of contrast, we have noted clear parallels in Derrida’s critique of 
Foucault’s aspiration to stand fully outside of reason, and seen that Derrida goes onto develop a powerful 
                                                 
18 Notwithstanding the element of fallibility that Habermas inscribes into his approach to democracy and 
more generally into his account of modernity as a progressive ‘learning process’, Allen nonetheless 
describes Habermas as a neo-Hegelian, and she similarly claims that Habermas’ theory is not sufficiently 
open-ended (Allen, 2016a, 22). Furthermore, Allen shows how Habermas’ justification of progress is 
Eurocentric, because he effectively positions the European or Euro-American participants as 




statement of the requirement for reason to take account of itself from a position of interiority, a 
requirement which he presents as both necessary and impossible. Given this Derridean perspective, we 
have additionally understood how Habermas’ account of ‘performative contradiction’ exhibits certain 
ideological qualities, where it both alludes to but also conceals the inherent paradoxes of philosophical 
grounding.  
By way of conclusion, we can return to the political consequences of these debates. Indeed, we 
need to recall the underlying reasons why Habermas has been anxious to challenge the poststructuralists 
and other purveyors of paradoxes. This is partly because - as he correctly perceives - if we concede that 
philosophical foundations have an inherently paradoxical status, we effectively establish a constitutive, i.e. 
irresolvable, uncertainty and ambiguity at the core of epistemology and contending truth claims. As 
Habermas puts it: ‘[a]nyone who abides in a paradox on the very spot once occupied by philosophy with its 
ultimate ground is not just taking up an uncomfortable position; one can only hold that place if one makes 
it at least minimally plausible that there is no way out. Even the retreat from an aporetic situation has to 
be barred’ (Habermas, 1987: 128). Habermas thinks that this scenario effectively undermines the 
achievements of the Enlightenment and disrupts the very possibility of effective social critique and 
responsible forms of political action. Here again we see marked contrast with Derrida, for whom the 
paradoxical status of contending truth claims does not so much rob subjects of their capacity for 
judgement, but rather provides productive conditions for responsible decision, speech, and action 
(Derrida, 1993: 16). 
Derrida’s thoughts on ethics and politics came to the fore in his later writings. Here, he associated 
the call to Justice and responsibility with a moment of ‘absolute alterity’, which he presented as somehow 
beyond the parameters of reason and discourse, and furthermore this is treated as the source of an 
unconditional ethical demand (Derrida, 1992: 243; 1993: 16). On the face of it, this appears to mark a point 
of departure from his earlier stress on the im/possible status of reason’s internal relationship with itself. 
The later Derrida emphasised instead the extra-discursive quality of the ethical injunction, and this is in 
25 
 
order to safeguard its ‘absolute’ status; the ethical demand is, as he put, literally ‘undeconstructable’. 
However, on closer examination we see that this does not perhaps represent a decisive break with his 
earlier position. Firstly, because Derrida is careful to stress the ‘unfathomable’ and ‘mystical’ quality of the 
source of the ethical demand; this is not a referent or a ‘transcendental signified’. In other words, nothing 
positive can be said about this moment of ‘absolute alterity’ which is now said to lie beyond the order of 
discourse. Moreover, Derrida also evidently continued to place the idea of constitutive paradox or aporia 
at the heart of his thinking on ethics and politics. Indeed, his central claim in these writings was that the 
unconditional demand is only ever manifest in the form of compromised and conditional laws and 
decisions. On this account, the aporetic structure of key areas of ethical life - for example with respect to 
mourning, hospitality, forgiveness, and justice – leaves the subject in a condition of ‘undecidability’. In 
each of these fields, there is a basic incommensurability between the infinite quality of the ethical demand 
and our finite efforts to respond to it (Derrida, 1992). It is precisely this paradoxical tension between the 
conditional and the unconditional that is at the centre of ethico-political experience. What this means, in 
effect, is that in the absence of the fully grounded status of foundational moral principles: political subjects 
are called upon to make only ever partially grounded decisions, i.e. decisions that are ‘guided’ by an 
unconditional demand, but which do not simply follow established rules or moral principles in a 
programmatic fashion (Derrida, 1993: 16, 17). Furthermore, Derrida stressed the open contingent 
possibility inherent in this ‘madness of the decision’, i.e. because ethico-political decisions also ‘advance 
towards a[n open] future’, by producing outcomes which ‘surprise the subjectivity of the subject’ and 
which ‘cannot be anticipated’ (Derrida, 1994: 37; 1997: 68). In other words, the constitutive aporia require 
a decision to be made, and this breaks with the parameters of the present situation and generates 
something new.  
These Derridean insights into the productive quality of aporia speak directly to our present political 
context. Indeed, the trends towards ‘post-truth’ politics will likely intensify in the years ahead. This will be 
fuelled for example by developments in digital technology, such as the impact of real-time face capture 
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and re-enactment technology as an instrument of ‘fake news’. These sorts of developments will surely 
accentuate the widespread cynicism that surrounds the public exchange of truth claims, and this will push 
the character of political debate even further from the model of idealised communication that Habermas 
invokes to ground his distinctive mode of critique. The Derridean viewpoint, on the other hand, offers a 
credible response to these developments. This does not reduce the exchange of truth claims to a Trumpian 
war of all against all, but insists instead on the continued possibility of responsible speech and action, and 
this in full recognition of the paradoxical status of the - necessary and yet impossible - appeal to rational 
and ethical foundations. In contrast to an overly restrictive ideal of ‘non-contradiction’ – manifest, for 
example, in Habermas’ unrealistic telos of ‘mutual understanding’, presided over supposedly by the ‘force 
[only] of the better argument’ - which forces an ‘either/or’ choice between opposites or contradictories; 
this is a vision of public debate which appreciates the conditions of intense pluralism characteristic of late 
modern life and allows for interminable (re)negotiations of inherently irresolvable differences. 
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